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THE HISTORIC ORIGIN OF TRIAL BY JURY.*
III.
The several ancient customs and institutions mentioned in
the previous installments of this paper. after contributing their
part to the development of. our present system, gradually disap-
peared; but, before being superseded, they in turn were no doubt
affected by the introduction of new institutions and the develop-
ment of other customs, some of which call for notice. Prior to
taking these up, however, it may be well to direct attention to
what Burke ha's to say upon the subject of our Anglo-Saxon an-
cestors'contribution to the development of trial by jury; hestates:1
"There are few things in our histo-y so irrational as the admira-
tion expressed by a certain class of writers for the institutions of
our barbarous Anglo-Saxon ancestors;" and he expresses the opin-
ion that "trial by jury did not exist till long after the [Norman]
Conquest." This latter assertion, as we -have seen, is dissented
from by many other authorities upon the subject; but, whoever
may be right about the amount of credit due to the Anglo-Saxons
and Norimans, respectively, it seems to be very generally agreed
that the Normans caused the separation of the spiritual. and tem-
*Part I of this article was published in the November, 192T, issue of the
UNIVERSITY Op PENNSYLVANIA LAW REvIEW (Volume 7o), page x, et seq.;
Part II in the Januiry, 1922, issue, page 73, e seq.
'Burke's Hist. of Civilization in England, vol. 2, c 2, note 2.
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poral courts, and, on the other hand, that they introduced the
combat, or duel, as a means of determining civil suits as well as
questions of guilt or innocence in criminal cases.2 They also ap-
pointed justiciars (who were high royal judicial officers, supposed
to directly represent the crown) to try suits in various parts of
the country 3 and, under them, persons from the neighborhood
where the dispute arose were called to prove facts within their
own knowledge; 4 all of which were steps on the road to trial by
jury.
One of the most important institutions we have to con-
sider-which comes nearest, in time and character, says Prof.
Robertson," to English trial by jury,--is the system of "recog-
nition" by sworn inquest, introduced into England by the Nor-
mans. Such "inquest," says Stubbs in his Constitutional His-
tory, "is directly derived from the Frank capitularies, into which
it may have been adopted from the fiscal regulations of the Theo-..
dosian code, and thus owns some distant relationship with-the
Roman jurisprudence." The Frank capitularies, or early French
code of la*s, became Norman subsequent to 912, when Rollo
established himself in the territory afterwards known as Nor-
mandy. Lesser says,6 "These capitularies-so called because ot
their division into chapters [or capitidal] were promulgated by
the kings, after consideration thereof in a general council or
assembly, and are thus of mixed kingly and popular origin."
However derived, the inquest by recognition was originally
to ascertain facts in the interest of the crown or the exchequer-
as for purposes of taxation;" but it was gradually allowed be-
tween subjects, to settle disputes of fact. Mr. Freeman, in his
"Norman Conquest," 8 states that the Norman rulers of England
3vere obliged, more than the native rulers would have been, to
rely on this system for accurate information. "The Norman
'Lesser, pp. 9r, x03, n. z5; Forsyth, pp. z24, 12S.
'Forsyth, p. 8'; Lesser, p. 9t.
I Forsyth, p. go
'Encyc. Brit., 9th Am. Maxwell Somerville ed., title, Jury.
'Hist. Jury System, p. 94.
'Id., P. 93.
'Vol. S, p. 451 el req.
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Conquest," says Professor Robertson, "therefore fostered the
growth of those native germs, common to England with other
countries, out of which the institution of juries grew"; and it
is suggested, in a foot note to Professor Robertson's article, that
this is the chief reason for the remarkable development of the
jury system in England. The inauguration of the inquest by
recognition, with its analogies to the native institutions, already
described, was entirely consistent with this policy of fostering
"the growth of native germs," as will no doubt be observed from
the account I am about to give.
The system of recognition consisted in questions of 'fact
being submitted to sworn witnesses in the local courts, who deter-
mined the issues involved. Lesser 0 says: "By virtue of the
institution thus presented, as a substitute for the existing ineffi-
cient modes of trial, the power and duty to decide in a Farticular
case was entrusted to a limited number of freemen selected from
the district; the number was generally twelve or some multi-
ple of twelve. This delegated body, unlike the compurgators, did
not act without knowledge of the facts involved in the dispute,
but such kno vledge was "not acquired by means of any evidence
submitted to or predicated upon argument heard -by them; they
decided entirely upon their own personal knowledge and informa-
tion. In the selection of these persons, who, were called recog-
nitors [reviewers, investigators], care was taken that they should
be acquainted with the circumstances of the case, with the liti-
gantparties, and with the situation and ownership of the dis-
puted property; they were, therefore, invariably chosen from the
immediate vicinity of the paities or of the land in question. In
doubtful cases they were strictly examined, to discover the
amount and source of their knowledge. When appointed, they
heard no evidence or allegations, but retired apart, and by com-
paring their previous information, whether acquired by sight of
the occurrence or by traditions in the vicinage, or by other means,
they rendered their decision or verdict, veredictum, upon oath. As
they assumed to speak upon oath, from theiri own personal knowl-
edge, they were liable to the penalties of perjury, if they returned
'Hist. Jury System, p.- ..
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a false -v rdict. Thus there was substituted, for the mere numeri-
cal preponderance of oaths, by irresponsible compurgators, a deci-
sion upon knowledge, by twelve recognitors, who acted upon
some cognizance of the facts involved in the dispute, but they
derived that information from themselves; they were, indeed, a
jury of witnesses testifying to each other." 10
The extension of the inquest by recognition began with the
assize of novel disseisin,1 ' whereby the king protected by royal
writ and inquest of neighbors every seisin of a freehold, and
was followed by the grand assize, applicable generally to ques-
tions affecting freehold. 2
Where a complainant had been disseised, the parties appeared
in court and made their respective claims, which they offered to
prove by champions, who were obliged to testify, from their own
knovledge, of the justice of the respective claims; 13 though hear-
say evidence was not excluded. 1' The case, when in doubt, was
decided by the outcome of a duel, which followed, according to
Canon Stubbs,1 5 as "a sort of ultimate expedient to obtain a
practical decision, an expedient partly akin to the ordeal-as a
judgment of God-and partly based on the idea that, where legal
measures had failed, recourse must be had to the primitive law
of force"; this method of trial soon fell into unpopularity because
might become right, and, in a suit between a rich owner and a
poor man, the former could- afford to hire the better champions,
thus easily defeating his adversary. Though little used, trial by
battle was not formally abolished until the early part of the 19 th
century, by statute 59 Geo. III, c. 46, which was passed as a
result of the decision in Ashford v. Thornton,1. where, to the
amazement of the profession, it was held that this ancient device
was still a legal method of settling disputes in the courts.
"See also Pomeroy, Mun. L., secs. 1SA-8.
"Statute of Henry II.
"Lesser, ppi. xi2, Ir3.
'Forsyth, p. io2.
"Id., p. 103.
i Const. Hist. Eng., vol. x, e. 13, p. 653.
31 B. & Ald. 4o5.
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When a defendant did not choose to accept an offer of com-
bat, he could avail himself of the grand assize, which more nearly
approaches our trial by jury; this substituted, for the testimony
ant physical powers of the champion, the oath of twelve knights.17
The sheriff sumnmoned four knights of the.neighborhood, and
these, being sworn, chose "twelve lawful knights most cognizant
of the facts," whose duty it was to determine, on their oaths, the
right to the land. If they all knew the facts and were agreed as
to their verdict, that ended the matter; if some or all were ignor-
ant, the fact was certified in court, and new knights were named
until twelve were found to be agreed. The same course was
followed whern the twelve were not unanimous, new jurors being
added until the twelve were agreed. This was called afforcing
the assize2 8
The knowledge of th.e knights was acquired independently of
,the trial; "so entirely," says Forsyth, "did [they] proceed upon
their own previously formed view of the facts in dispute that
they seem to have considered themselves at liberty to pay no.
attention to •evidence offered in court, however clearly it might
disprove the case which they were prepared to support." 19
. The use of recognition is prescribed by the constitutions of
Clarendon, I I66, for cases of dispute as to lay or clerical ten-
ures, and in course of time the judges who held the assize were
directed to entertain cases other than those involving land. In
1285 we find it provided that,; for convenience of suitors and
others, instead of bringing the parties to NVestminster, inquisition
of trespass and other pleas shall be determined before the jus-
tices of assize. The grand assize was discontinued as a mode of
trial in 18M3
20
I Forsyth,21 writing on the general subject in hand, states:
"The machinery for this nxode of inquiry was ready in the exist-
ence of the jurata, so familiar to the people in the decision of
"' Forsyth, pp. o3-4; Starkie, p. 14.
"Forsyth, pp. 104-105.
Jd., p. 107.
2Id., p. z23.
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disputes, and the assize supplied the model of the form in which
it [the jitrata] was henceforth to appear. The transition from a
varying number of neighbors assembled at a county or other
court, to that of a fixed number, namely, twelve, summoned to the
assize [or jurata] court, was easy and slight; and the verdict of
the jury was originally neither more nor less than the testimony
of the latter.
' 22
Admitting with Stubbs, 23 Reeves, 24 and others, that the Nor-
man recognition was the instrument which the lawyers in Eng-
land ultimately shaped into trial by jury, Freeman maintains,
25
none the less, that the latter is a distinctively English thing. For-
syth comes to substantially the same conclusion ;26 noting the
jury germs of the Anglo-Saxon period, he shows how out of
those elements, which continued in full force under the Anglo-
Normans, was produced at last the institution of the jury, as
we now know it. Other writers give much credit to the effect of
the civil law in influencing the establishment of the jury systen
in England. Strahan, in his preface to Domat's Civil Laws,
says: "We are not to look upon the civil law altogether as a for-
eign commodity, with respect to England, some of the particular
laws thereof having been enacted for deciding controversies
which arose here in England, and bearing date from this country.
The greatest part of this island was governed wholly by the civil
law, for the space of about three hundred years ;217 during which
time some of the most eminent among the Roman lawyers . .. ,
whose opinions are collected in the body of the civil law, sat in
the seat of judgment, here in England, and distributed justice
to the inhabitants; and the law thus administered is embodied
Iin Justinian's Code." While Judge Cooley 28 states that, since
Roman institutions, "which resembled in many particulars our
jury, were in full force in England for, more than three cen-
" See also Stubbs's Const. Hist. Eng., voL x, p. 6x7.
' Const. Hist. Eng., vol. z, p. 617.
I Hist. of Eng. Law, voL I, pp. 82-88.
"Norman Conquest, vol. s, P. 451 et seq.
" Trial by Jury, pp. 5, Iz..
"A. D. 41-396.
" Am. Cyc. V. IX, p. 722.
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turies, it would seem unreasonable to deny them any important
influence in creating the trial by jury." 29
Finally, John Norton Pomerov30 summarizes the situation
thus: "The jury trial in its present matured form involves two
very different elements, each equally important, but having no
historical or theoretical connection. They are .[i] the decision
of the facts in a judicial trial by a number of individuals, dis-
tinct and separate from the official judge or magistrate; and [2]
the free choice of these individuals from among the. mass ot
ordinary citizens. The Romans possessed the first of these
features in their administration of justice; the origin of the
second is to be found in the tribal customs of the German peo-
ples, who overran the provinces of the Western empire, includ-
ing the Angles and Saxons, who settled in Britain." He then
reviews-the folk-courts of the shires, or gamotes, which were
composed of assembled.free men presided over by the ealdorman,.
or the sheriff, or his deputy, and trial by compurg .tors, which
he asserts developed into recogfiitors-"a jury, as it were, of
witnesses," stating,-"In the reign of Henry III [the practice] was
introduced of joining with these recognitors others who were
actual witnesses .of the transaction"; but, as he says, "all united
in rendering the verdict." Mr. Pomeroy then goes on to state
that, "during the reign of Edward III [I327-1177], a still more
important and radical change was effected; witnesses were added
to or connected with the recognitors, who communicated to the
latter their knowledge of the facts, but took no part in the de-
cision. .. . The innovation once made, the progress of aiding
the recognitors by the testimony of outside parties was rapid." '1
None of the writers on the subject shed any clear light,
however, upon the supposed transition period, when jurors,
as such, ceased to be witnesses, and the latter, as such, ceased to
be jurors.
But see Pollock & Maitland, Hist. Eng. L, p. iii.
"Johnson's Cyc., title, Jury. '
' Seealso Pomeroy Mur. L, sees. x24-I33.
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Pollock & 'Maitland, in their History of English Law,
say:32 "We have to explain why the history of the jury took a
turn which made our jurors not witnesses, but judges of fact;
and the requisite explanation we may find in three ancient ele-
ments which are present in trial by jury, so soon as that trial
becomes a well-established institution. For want of better
names, we may call them [i] the arbitral, [2] the communal,
and [] the quasi-judicial." The authors then explain how [i]
the arbitral element is recognized in the phrase, used by litigants,
"putting themselves upon the country," as it involves consent and
submission.- They next explain [2] how the verdict of the
jurors is not just the decision of twelve men-it is a verdict
of "a pays, a- country, a neighborhood, a community;" and, in.
this connection, they say, "The justices seemed to feel that, if
they analyzed the verdict, they would miss the very thing for
which they were looking, the opini6n of the country." Lastly,
the authors explain how [3] we may "detect in the verdict of the
jurors an element which we cannot but call quasi-judicial," say-
ing, "they [the jurors] must collect testimony, they muqt weigh
it and state the net result in a verdict." Pollock and Maitla'nd
then go on to state: "It is to thepresence of these three ele-
ments that we may ascribe the ultimate victory of that principle
of our law which requires an unanimous verdict," saying, in
elaboration of this thought: "For a long time we see in England
various ideas at work: If some of the recognitors profess
themselves ignorant, they can be set aside and other men can
be called to fill their places. If there is but one dissentient juror,
his words can be disregarded and he can be fined .. .; but
gradually all these plans are abandoned and unanimity is re-
quired [even to the point of shutting the jurors up without meat
or drink]. The arbitral and communal principles are triumph-
ing; the parties to the litigation have put themselves upon a
certain test-that test is the voice of the country. Just as a cor-
poration can have but one will, so a country can have but one
voice . . , Nor must it escape us that the justices are pursuing
Vol. 2, pp. 622-9.
M71E HISTORIC ORIGIN OF TRIAL BY JURY
a course which puts the verdict of the country on a level with
the old modes of proof . . . The vcrcdictum patria is assimi-
lated [compared] to the judiciunt dei. tSo also] English judges
find that a requirement of unanimity is the line of least resist-
ance; it spares them so much trouble . . . It saved the judges
of the middle ages not only from this moral responsibility, but
also from enmities and feuds. Likewise, it saved them from the,
as yet unattempted task, a critical dissection of testimony . . .
The principle that the jurors are to speak only about matter of
fact, and are not concerned with matter of law, is present from
the first. They are not judges, not doomnsmen; their function
is not to 'find the doom' as the suitors do in the old court, but
to 'recognize,' to speak the truth."
Forsyth 33 takes issue with those who think the witnesses
at any time acted judicially, but admits that, "in so far as their
evidence was conclusive, it may be taken to have been equivalent
to a judicial sentence ;" and. he says, "this has perhaps misled
. . . others to suppose that they did pronounce such a sentence
in the character of judges." He adds: "Originally, indeed,
there may have been no difference between these two characters,
for, when all the freemen of the hundred attended the gamot, or
court, they necessarily included those who could give evidence
upon the matters that came before it, and were as much mem-
bers of the court as the rest; their testimony, therefore, on a
disputed question was the judicial decision upon it." His thought
is that, "afterwards, when the court consisted of a limited num-
ber, the judges [in- the sense of jurors] and witnesses must
have been different persons, although the effect of the evidence
of the latter remained the same.'
It appears, however, that the trial by an -indefinite number
of secta-tors for many years after the Normans -came to Eng-
land, and not until the reign of Henry II (ii54-Ii89) was a
real approach made to a general custom of trial by jury, with
outside witnesses called before such a body.84
Trial by Jury, pp. 2"5-6.
"Reeves's Hist. of Eng. Law, v. 1 pp. 82-88.
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Indeed, some historians insist that till the reign of Henry
VI (1422 to 1461 ) trial by jury, to all intents and purposes, was
but trial by witnesses ;" Forsyth 86 asserts that in the reign of
that monarch, "with the exception of the requirement of personal
knowledge in the jurors, derived from near neighborhood, or
residence, the jury system had become in all essential features
similar to what now exists;" but, by the middle of the thir-
teenth century, the jury had become so firmly established as an
institution that Bracton 37 describes its then existing form, and
tells us that prior perjury fby, or the serfdom of, a proposed
juror, or his near relationship or intimacy with, or enmity to,
the parties litigant, would disqualify him for service.
Mrs. Margaret C. Klingelsmith, librarian of the Biddle Law
Library of the University of Pennsylvania, in a paper published
in the UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REViEW 86 a few.
years back, produces an array of matter, which she modestly
calls " "examples taken here and there from among the many
on record," to prove her belief "that the earliest juries of whih
we have records were not the sole witnesses as to the facts;" that,
although the jurors may have been witnesses, they also heard
others, took testimony-sworn testimony-and were expected to
ascertain the facts of the cases before them for decision from
documents and evidence which supplemented their own
knowledge.
However, in the course of time, jurors became judges.of
the evidence submitted to them, as well as witnesses; and from
this was gradually evolved the system whereby they were solely
judges of the evidence, and were not supposed to have any
personal knowledge of the fads involved.
When the triers of fact changed from recognitors to those
having power to decide on testimony laid before them, it was,
no doubt, found essential to have some superintendence of the
' Macclachlan, Eng. Cycl., III, 26.
" Trial by Jury, c. 7, p. z23.
" De Laud, book 4, c. x9.
n Vol. 66, pp. io7-i2.
'Id., p. 116.
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admission of testimony, in order to exclude that which was im-
proper; and this necessity became the foundation of the system
of rules governing the admission of evidence which we now
follow.
The practice of receiving evidence openly in court also led
to the extension of the duties of attorneys in the trial of cases;
they were permitted to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
also to influence by argument the decision of juries, and, in this
development, any juror, who might have personal knowledge of
.the facts which were the subject-matter of inquiry, was obliged
to offer himself as a witness, so as to bring his testimony before
the rest of the jurors in a safe and proper manner. We find
this held in Bushnell's Case,40 about 167o; and finally Lord
Ellenborough, in the reign of George III, plainly said that a
verdict based on the jurors' own knowledge, rather than on
facts produced in evidence, should not be sustained.41
A word of warning should be given to those who wish to
delve into these antiquities. Anyone who has read with care
the preceding pages will be struck by the great divergence of
opinion among the writers quoted, some of them historians of
unquestioned authority. While it is possible to reconcile a few
of these differences, quite a number are fundamental, and they
must stand in opposition. Then there is the difficulty of decid-
ing on the trustworthiness of the individual author. The
authority of one generation is often discredited in the next, and
-sometimes reinstated later. Green's "History of the English
People" is now generally recognized to be more entertaining
than reliable - as also Macaulay's History. The authors
cited in my text, and quoted from quite extensively, are con-
sidered more as purveyors of facts than as authorities in the.
development of the story. The student should be careful not
to place too much reliance on well-known writers. Forsyth's
"Trial by Jury," quoted by me quite frequently, is characterized
in the English Dictionary of National Biography 42 as "a careful
*Vaughan, 135, 6 How. St Tr. 9_o%
Rex v. Hutton, 4 Maule & S. 532, decided in i8x6.
" VoL II of Supplement
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and trustworthy study (quoted with high commendation in
Lieber's 'Civil Liberty')." The New International Encyclo-
padia says that some of Forsyth's legal works "are of great
value and are considered authorities on the subject which they
treat ;" yet Mr. Hampton L. Carson, well known as a learned
and accurate master of legal lore, tells me that Forsyth is not
now considered a very reliable authority. Reeves's History of
English Law is a standard work; but W. F. Finlason, the editor
of the second English edition,'43 constantly challenges the cori-
rectness of the text. One of the authorities Finlason relies on,
in so doing, is the "Mirror of Justices," which Pollock and Mait-
land 44 utterly condemn as consisting of "false history," "specu-
lations" and "satire." So, it may be seen, a student with
thirst for real knowledge will probably have to go back to the
original data, and judge for himself, which the present writer
frankly states he has had no opportunity to do.
It seems apparent we must all agree with the statement,
previously made, that the origin of trial by jury is not traceable
to any particular institution, country or nation, but is the net
result of the customs of the various peoples who contributed
to English civilization. 45 We must, however, be impressed that
the inauguration and development of the Norman system of
recognition marked a distinct advance toward our- present mode
of trial; this Norman institution no doubt affected, and maybe
was affected by, existing institutions of earlier Anglo-Saxon
origin, just as the latter had been affected by, and perhaps to a
degree moulded on, still more primitive ones, which showed
Roman influence. It nevertheless appears that the functions of
the ancient and modern juries are distinct, in that the former,
in most instances, were merely compurgators, deciding. on their
own knowledge, while the latter are judges of fact, deciding on
evidence; yet the two are connected by the tribunal of mixed
functions, which decided on its own knowledge, assisted by the
testimony of witnesses; and from all of these came the jury, as
"Reprinted in ist American edition.
"Vol. 1, p. 2&8
"See Ponieroy, Mun. Law, sec. 27; Cooley, Am. Cyc. vol. IX, title, Jury.'
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now existing, which decides exclusively on the evidence pre-
sented before it. Just when and precisely how these changes
came to pass, as before said, are points which none of the stu-
dents of the subject seem able to tell us much about; but we
know what we possess, and every lawyer should have some
knowledge of the origin and development of this, the greatest
practical administrative achievement in the field of the common
law.
Robert von Moschzisker,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.
